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The necessity of contingency
Rereading Althusser on structural causality
Stefano Pippa
Among the concepts proposed by Althusser in 
the course of his famous symptomatic reading of 
Marx’s Capital, structural causality plays a central 
role. Extrapolated from Marx’s writings via a detour 
through the philosophy of Spinoza, it came to rep-
resent the concept in which Althusser summed up 
‘Marx’s immense theoretical revolution’.1 As is well 
known, for Althusser, by breaking with the other 
two models of causality available in Marx’s time (the 
mechanistic causality derived from Descartes and the 
‘expressive’ causality derived from Leibniz and above 
all Hegel), ‘structural causality’ made it possible for 
the first time to think of history as a process deprived 
of any essence and telos, without subject and without 
end – or, as Althusser puts it in another formulation, 
as a ‘structure of structures’ without any centre.2 It 
was, therefore, the concept that condensed the anti-
humanist reading produced in the 1960s by Althusser 
and his collaborators, one that soon became famous 
under the label ‘structural Marxism’.
If the centrality of structural causality to the 
overall project of recasting Marxism is beyond 
doubt, the fate of this concept is curious. For one 
thing, the number of pages devoted to the explicit 
theoretical elaboration of structural causality in 
Reading Capital is rather few (fourteen in the French 
edition). More importantly, the concept will soon 
disappear from Althusser’s discourse, in his attempt 
to correct his so-called ‘theoreticism’ and to reject 
the allegations of ‘structuralism’, to which ‘structural 
causality’ evidently gave rise through its name. It is 
well known that structural causality was one of the 
concepts that led to fierce criticism of Althusser. 
For his proximity to structuralism, he was accused 
of denying history; for his reliance on Spinoza, he 
was accused of endorsing a metaphysical concept of 
necessity that did not leave any space for freedom 
or – more importantly for the purposes of this article 
– for contingency. Famously (to limit ourselves to the 
anglophone reception), Althusser was attacked by the 
British Marxist E.P. Thompson, who accused him of 
endorsing a deterministic philosophy of history that 
asserted the timeless reproduction of the structure 
of a certain mode of production.3 The same type of 
critique was put forward, first, by Hindess and Hirst, 
and then by Laclau and Mouffe, in their Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy. There, the latter authors argued 
that the most vital part of Althusser’s project is to 
be found in his concept of ‘overdetermination’, but 
that soon after the essay (dating from 1962) in which 
that concept was propounded, Althusser retreated 
towards a hopeless metaphysical rationalism that 
culminated in the concept of structural causality. In 
their reading, Althusser’s attempt to pass from Hegel 
to Spinoza in his reading of Marx only resulted in the 
substitution of a strictly logico-mathematical neces-
sity for a teleological necessity governing history.4 
In his now-classical study on Western Marxism, 
Perry Anderson remarked that Althusser’s Spinozism 
was so deep that the metaphysical determinism of 
Spinoza could be found without any modification, in 
particular in the ‘implacable logic’, as he called it, of 
‘structural causality’.5 As Peter Thomas has recently 
noted, Anderson’s study of the relationship between 
Althusser and Spinoza was seminal: most later inter-
pretations of Althusser’s Marxism merely repeating 
Anderson’s reading without any modification.6
In this article, I argue that Althusser’s concept of 
structural causality cannot be reduced to a meta-
physical necessitarianism of Spinoza’s kind or a struc-
turalist determinism. My aim is to show that, far 
from being a strictly determinist concept, structural 
causality was the concept through which Althusser 
attempted for the first time to develop a logic capable 
of including contingency as a structural dimension, 
and that, far from asserting the timeless reproduction 
of the structure (i.e. of a certain mode of produc-
tion), it should be read as the concept through which 
Althusser tried to propose a non-dialectical theory of 
structural change. 
Now, it is well known today, after the publication 
of Althusser’s late writings, that he proposed in the 
1980s a new philosophy for Marxism that he named 
materialism of ‘the encounter’ or of ‘the swerve’.7 
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However, I do not intend to project the problematic 
of the late Althusser onto his theories of the 1960s. I 
will take an opposite approach and attempt to show 
that ‘structural causality’ was, in fact, the site of 
Althusser’s effort to flesh out a new way of thinking 
about the interrelation of necessity and contingency 
in history, rooted in a long-standing preoccupation 
with the notion of ‘necessity’ that can be dated as 
far back as the late 1940s. In order to do so, I will 
proceed via a reading of some crucial moments of the 
early Althusser (that is, Althusser before the 1960s), 
so as to show his attempt both to deconstruct and to 
reconstruct the notions of necessity that he found in 
Hegel and the orthodox Marxism of the 1950s. I will 
then move on to a ‘symptomatic reading’ of structural 
causality itself as conceptualized in Reading Capital 
and as developed, in the months after the publication 
of the book, in some posthumously published texts.
Althusser avant Althusser
Unlike the work produced by Althusser after 1980, 
the writings dating from before the 1960s have 
received very little attention. However, an overview 
of the most important writings preceding the pub-
lication of For Marx and Reading Capital is highly 
instructive. One of the main lines that emerge is one 
concerning the status of ‘necessity’ within Marxism, 
a circumstance that allows us to argue that the knot 
of problems centred around the relationship between 
‘causality’ and ‘necessity’ in history forms the core 
of Althusser’s philosophical preoccupations in the 
run-up to his reading of Marx in the 1960s. The 
first time that Althusser tackled the problem is as 
early as 1948 in his dissertation on Hegel.8 Although 
this dissertation has been considered (and quickly 
dismissed) as proof that – before becoming fiercely 
anti-Hegelian – Althusser had indeed been Hegelian,9 
a careful reading suggests that Althusser was already 
pointing out the problems of a humanist reading of 
Marx and asserting a sharp distinction between the 
young Marx and the Marx of Capital. He did so by 
focusing on Marx’s relations to Hegel’s philosophy 
of history, thus anticipating the later critique that he 
will level against Hegel in the 1960s. What is charac-
teristic of this early text is that the central question 
of the Hegel–Marx relationship is not centred around 
the problem of science and ideology (as it was to be 
in the 1960s), but bears instead on the question of 
the status of necessity. In his reading of Hegel (which 
demonstrates, contrary to what has sometimes been 
suggested, that Althusser knew the entire corpus of 
Hegel’s writings perfectly), Althusser is particularly 
attentive to the structure of the central operator of 
Hegel’s philosophy: his concept of ‘concept’. Althusser 
describes it as ‘pure interiority’ with ‘no outside’ (later 
on, this will be the very definition of ideology), as a 
‘process of envelopment’ whose activity of interior-
ization aims to posit itself as ‘the origin of the origin’ 
and to recover all ‘free contingent events’ as ‘moments 
of the fully accomplished totality’.10 But his attention 
goes in particular to the fundamental consequences 
that such a view has for the conception of historical 
necessity. In Hegel’s hands, so argues Althusser, his-
torical necessity is merely the (teleo)logical necessity 
of the concept rendered indifferent to the concrete 
determinations of history, which in turn are endowed 
only with an apparent substantiality incapable of 
‘affecting’ the unfolding of historical necessity itself.11 
What is interesting for our purposes here is not 
the correctness or otherwise of such critique, but 
rather the consequences that Althusser draws for his 
reading of Marx, to whom he turns in the last sec-
tions of this text. The question that Althusser poses 
here is whether or not Marx’s critique of Hegel is a 
consistent one. Althusser argues that Marx’s explicit 
criticism of Hegel (present in his early writings) is 
still trapped in a Hegelian framework. Assuredly, 
as Althusser notes, Marx refuses to see in the Prus-
sian state the ‘end of history’. Nevertheless, such a 
rejection takes the form of a mere displacement of 
the idea of an accomplishment of history towards 
the future. For all Marx’s criticism, in his analyses 
of the vicissitudes of ‘alienation’ we ‘find Hegelian 
necessity again, in its most rigorous form – that 
of the concept’.12 However, the real innovation is 
to be found, according to Althusser, in Capital. For 
Althusser here, Marx understood that
the transcendental was history, but he did not 
consider it possible to think history in general, 
apart from the concrete content of the dominant 
historical totality … he did not posit the categorial 
totality as eternal.13 
In his later work, argues Althusser, Marx abandoned 
the idea of the ‘end of history’ as well as the idea of 
history as a teleological process, paving the way for a 
new conception of the transcendental and therefore 
of historical causality:
if we abandon the idea of the end of history and 
the eternal nature of meanings [l’eternité des 
significations] … then history becomes the general 
element in which we move and leave … the con-
crete transcendental … that conditions and de-
termines us. But since history is not over, there 
is no eternal transcendental logic, but rather, at 
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every instant, an articulated historical structure which 
dominates the world in the manner of an a-priori, and 
conditions it. The reality of history resides, from 
this standpoint, in the dialectical nature of the 
structure that conditions events, but is also trans-
formed by them in its turn. The historical totality is 
a concrete, dialectical transcendental, a condition 
modified by what it conditions.14
What is important here is that for Althusser, while 
Capital provides us with a new ‘transcendental ana-
lytic’, the transcendental itself is not the Träger of 
any metaphysical necessity, but only of what he calls 
a ‘de facto necessity’.15 This perspective, which aims 
to abolish the ontological separation between the 
transcendental and the empirical (and which could 
be called ‘empirical transcendentalism’), implies a 
new, ‘weaker’ conception of necessity bound up with 
an ‘articulated historical structure’ that both condi-
tions and is conditioned by the ‘manifold that it 
conditioned’.16 The dissertation ends precisely on this 
problem of an adequate conceptualization of ‘neces-
sity’ in Marxism, which Althusser resolves through 
the concepts of ‘de facto necessity’ and ‘empirical 
transcendentalism’, although they are left largely un-
developed. However, this attests that the concept of 
necessity was very much at the core of his preoccupa-
tions and that it was also the central concern, from 
as early as 1948, of his relationship with Marxism. 
Furthermore, it shows that it was by reflecting on 
this question that Althusser introduced, well before 
For Marx, the idea of a break between the early Marx 
and the Marx of Capital.
The same concerns with the category of necessity 
in Marx and Marxism are present in at least three 
other writings from the 1950s. In the course of the 
lectures on the philosophy of history that he gave 
during the 1950s at the ENS, for example, Althusser 
grapples with the question of history as a closed or 
open process.17 The central idea is, again, that what 
distinguishes Hegel from Marx is that Hegel can only 
think of history as a ‘closed’ process – that is, from 
the point of view of the Spirit reconciled with itself 
at the end of the historical unfolding. By contrast, 
Marx provided us with the means to conceive of 
history as an open process.18 In this course, Althusser 
abandons the idea of an ‘empirical transcendentalism’ 
and shows a more rigid orthodoxy. For instance, 
when discussing the issue of the laws of history, he 
relies quite heavily not only on Lenin but also on 
Stalin, and states that ‘it is the functional nature of 
the relations of production that allow us to compre-
hend the necessity of the transition from determinate 
social conditions to different ones, i.e. revolutions’.19 
However, the course is particularly interesting 
because it shows the central tension in Althusser 
between the exigency of orthodoxy, leaning towards 
the ‘iron laws of history’, and the need to come up 
with a less simplistic conception of necessity than the 
one provided by the dogma. 
The solution that Althusser introduced here is in 
more than one sense much less interesting than the 
one he outlined in his dissertation. In the attempts to 
limit the validity of the ‘laws’ discovered by Marxism, 
he appeals to an ‘inexhaustible reality’ that precedes 
the science of history and ‘always surpasses it’.20 Such 
an appeal must be read as an attack on the idea of 
absolute knowledge; that is, as a passage levelled 
against the idea that Marxism is a philosophy of 
history stating laws that are valid once and for 
all. The obvious problem is, however, that such an 
appeal to the need of rectification of the outcomes 
of scientific research stands in contrast to, or at least 
in a problematic relationship with, the very idea 
of the ‘necessity of the transition’ that Althusser 
nonetheless maintains. If history is not reducible to 
a ‘law’, and if there is always a sort of ‘excess’ over 
the conceptualization of it, how can one argue that 
there is something like a ‘necessity of the transition’? 
This shows perhaps the difficulties that Althusser 
was facing in those years of almost strict orthodoxy. 
But it also shows that even in those years he was 
at odds with the Marxist (or Stalinist) conception 
of necessity, and somehow attempted to correct it 
though an operation of Ptolemization that, instead 
of calling into question the central tenets of a theory, 
was content to add epicycles in the hope of making 
things work. 
However, the need to produce a new concept of 
causality is raised in an article written by Althusser 
in response to Ricœur’s and Aron’s attacks on the 
very idea of a science of history. Althusser responds 
to Ricœur’s argument by conceding that history may 
be about ‘an inexhaustible nature of man’, or about 
freedom, but refusing to accept their conclusion that 
such a view could be used to ‘refuse in advance the 
pretences of history to objectivity’.21 The problem that 
Althusser has with Ricœur and Aron is crystallized 
in an interesting remark about historical causality. 
Althusser argues that the problems raised by the very 
opposition put forth by Ricœur must be resolved not 
by philosophically opposing two domains (histoire 
vécue against science), which do not belong to the 
same ‘level’, but through the elaboration of a concept 
of causality capable of rendering history intelligible;22 
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that is, on an epistemological level. Comparing this 
answer with the solution Althusser proposed in his 
course – which appealed, precisely, to the ‘inexhaust-
ible’ character of history – it is difficult not to notice 
that the argument is the same, even if Althusser does 
not use it as a means to deny to history the status of 
science. This shows that, in all probability, at that 
time Althusser was not insensitive to the critiques 
of Marxism launched by such thinkers as Aron and 
Ricœur and attempted to attenuate the Marxist 
concept of necessity, or at least to problematize it.23 
A further step – and indeed a decisive one – in 
this direction is taken by Althusser in his book on 
Montesquieu, written a few years later – crucially, 
after 1956.24 In this work, which shows a degree of 
independent thinking comparable to the dissertation 
on Hegel (to which in a sense it returns), Montesquieu 
is seen as a direct precursor to Marx in that ‘he 
was the first person before Marx who undertook 
to think history without attributing it to an end, 
without projecting the consciousness of men and 
their hopes onto the time of history.’25 More impor-
tantly, Montesquieu became for Althusser a means to 
develop a new schema of historical causality based on 
the idea of ‘multiple determinations’. In this sense, 
Althusser’s reading of the Ésprit des lois can be seen 
as the attempt to develop a new concept of complex 
necessity. 
The first point that Althusser makes is that 
Montesquieu provides a ‘dynamic’ model for the 
conceptualization of historical totality based on 
the dialectics between two elements: the ‘nature’ of 
the government (the question of who holds power) 
and the ‘principle’ (the passion by which a certain 
government is made to act).26 It is the relationship 
between these two elements that allows Montesquieu 
to posit the problem of the ‘motor of history’. Arguing 
against the idea that Montesquieu theorized a perfect 
circularity of historical totalities – a position held at 
the time by Cassirer – Althusser insists that between 
‘principle’ and ‘nature’ there exists, in Montesquieu, 
an asymmetry, which posits the dominance of 
one element over the other: the dominance of the 
‘principle’. Althusser argues that (1) this dominance 
performs a distribution of efficacy: the principle is 
dominant, but ‘nature’ can act back on it; (2) it breaks 
with circularity, with the idea of an ‘expressive total-
ity’, according to which, as Althusser will say later 
on in Reading Capital, all the elements of a certain 
totality are directly determined by a single principle, 
thus forming a whole with no internal differentia-
tion. However – and it is here that we approach the 
question of a complex necessity – Althusser argues 
that the internal asymmetry is, in turn, sustained by 
another type of causality, which Althusser extracts 
from a reading of the second part of the Ésprit des 
lois. In the second part of his book, Montesquieu 
adds, in the form of empirical observations, a series 
of determining factors other than the two previously 
mentioned, such as climate, soil, religion and others. 
As Althusser notes: ‘in front of the new determinant 
factors suggested [by Montesquieu] … it is hard to 
avoid the impression of disorder. The unity of a pro-
found law has turned into a plurality of causes. The 
totality is lost in a list.’27 
In reality, this list is only apparently one. For 
Althusser, the impression of disorder is due to the 
fact that Montesquieu did not produce the concept 
of their causality. For Althusser, what characterizes 
them is that their efficacy is not a direct one: these 
factors act on the ‘principle’ – on the dominant 
element of the dialectics of history – only through 
an ‘indirect causality’ that breaks with a mechanical 
type of determination.28 This means that the ‘prin-
ciple’, the dominant or determinant factor in Mon-
tesquieu’s model, is in itself determined by factors 
that are not separable from it. Althusser criticizes 
Montesquieu for his failure to conceptualize this 
idea and, to account for it, he introduces the notion 
of a causality through ‘conjunction’ and ‘encounter’.29
just when they are acting on the government and 
determining certain of its essential laws, all these 
causes apparently so radically disparate, converge on 
a common point: the customs, morals and manners 
of being, feeling and acting that they confer on 
the men who live within their empire. From their 
encounter [rencontre] arises what Montesquieu calls 
the spirit of a nation.30
Thus, the very dialectics between principle and 
nature is sustained by another causality that encom-
passes a whole set of heterogeneous factors. The 
concept of ‘encounter’, introduced here for the first 
time, will soon become central to Althusser’s attempt 
to come up with a notion of causality capable of 
mediating or, better said, capable of articulating, 
necessity and contingency. The issue of contingency 
is certainly not present at this point, even if the idea 
of ‘encounter’ or ‘conjunction’ is introduced to dis-
place the idea of a mechanical or expressive necessity 
commanding the unfolding of a dialectical totality. 
The concept of structural causality will inherit and 
radicalize these issues, introducing the question of 
the relationship between necessity and contingency 
to the very heart of Althusser’s recasting of Marxism.
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Reading Capital: textual symptoms
As mentioned above, one of the criticisms that has 
been levelled against Althusser is that, with Reading 
Capital, he retreats from certain (good) intuitions that 
formed the core of For Marx – namely the concept of 
overdetermination – towards a (bad) metaphysical 
rationalism. Especially in the field of what is often 
referred to as post-Marxism, overdetermination is 
considered to open the way towards contingency, 
whereas ‘structural causality’ would close that door 
by asserting a strict determinism. However, the 
problem with the identification of ‘contingency’ as a 
central question for Reading Capital, and as a problem 
intimately related to the elaboration of structural 
causality, is that although a survey of all the occur-
rences of the word in the book reveals the persistence 
of its presence, it also reveals the unrigorous way in 
which it is used.31 In many places, Althusser seems 
to reject it.32 This can only reinforce the idea that 
necessity was for him the central question. However, 
a textual symptom, located in a strategic passage, 
suggests otherwise. In a passage from the introduc-
tion to Reading Capital (written after the seminar in 
which the papers collected in the book was com-
pleted) Althusser argues that, in the wake of the 
works of Foucault, Canguilhem and Bachelard, we 
are compelled to abandon the idea of history as a 
single uniform continuum, and that ‘we are begin-
ning to conceive this history as a history punctuated 
by radical discontinuities’. Immediately afterwards, 
he adds: 
We are thereby obliged to renounce every teleology 
of reason, and to conceive the historical relation 
between a result and its conditions of existence as 
a relation of production, and not of expression, and 
therefore as what, in a phrase that clashes with 
the classical system of categories and demands the 
replacement of those categories, we can call the 
necessity of its contingency.33
The expression ‘necessity of contingency’ is here 
mobilized against the idea of a simple and continuous 
teleology of reason, which Althusser (arguably a little 
hastily) attributes to the philosophy of Enlightenment 
and to Hegel.34 It is likewise opposed to what we can 
call a ‘logic of expression’, for which Althusser wants 
to substitute a ‘logic of production’. This opposition 
is, indeed, revealing. Given that, in For Marx and 
especially in Reading Capital, Althusser criticizes the 
concept of ‘expressive causality’ for its reductionism 
of the elements of a determinate ‘whole’ to an inner 
essence or principle, arguing for the new type of cau-
sality represented by ‘structural causality’, we have 
here the indication that ‘structural causality’ occupies 
the conceptual space indicated by the phrases ‘necessity 
of contingency’ and ‘logic of production’. It is certainly 
strange that Althusser does not bring structural cau-
sality itself into the discussion at this point. However, 
it is clear that we are confronted here with a decisive 
substitution: ‘necessity of contingency’ plays the role 
that will be taken on by structural causality, which 
will be opposed to the ‘expressive whole’ (that is, to 
a logic of expression) and to the Leibniz–Hegelian 
‘expressive causality’. 
Nonetheless, immediately after proposing this cat-
egory of ‘necessity of contingency’, Althusser fails to 
flesh it out. What is worse, he never mentions it again 
in Reading Capital, not even when, in chapter IX, he 
develops the concept of structural causality. We are 
confronted, at a textual level, with a problem: the 
‘enigma’ of the ‘necessity of contingency’ – this cat-
egory of which we are only told that ‘it clashes with 
the classical system of categories’ – seems to direct 
us to the concept of ‘structural causality’ (to which 
the opposition to the ‘logic of expression’ points), 
and yet ‘structural causality’ undeniably relies on 
the Spinozist concept of immanent causality, and for 
Spinoza ‘in rerum natura nullum datur contingens’;35 
in Althusser’s conceptualization of structural causal-
ity the problem of contingency is never mentioned 
per se. Notwithstanding this lexical problem – which 
I take here as a symptom – the opposition that we 
stressed suggests that structural causality is associ-
ated by Althusser himself with the category of ‘neces-
sity of contingency’, and therefore, in some way or 
another, Althusser considers the issue of contingency 
as central to his attempt to recast Marxism on the 
basis of the category of structural causality.
Absence and presence of the structure
Following this textual symptom, the problem is to 
understand how and if Althusser, in his elaborations 
of structural causality in Reading Capital, effectively 
manages to incorporate the ‘necessity of contingency’, 
and where precisely this incorporation can be found. 
Here, a certain displacement is needed with respect 
to the usual way of reading the concept of structural 
causality, which (when it isn’t dismissed as simply 
metaphysical or deterministic) insists on a certain 
tension between a Lacanian idea of the ‘absent 
cause’ and a more Spinozist model of an immanent 
causality). 
I want to suggest that structural causality is actu-
ally premissed upon a rejection of Lacan’s (structural-
ist) model of the absent cause, and also on a crucial 
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modification of Spinozist ontology of immanence. 
In order to disentangle the presence of ‘necessity of 
contingency’ – or at least Althusser’s attempt to make 
structural causality function as a conceptual elabora-
tion of this category – we need to move centre stage 
a category that is usually neglected in the analyses 
of structural causality: the category of ‘determinate 
absence’, and the reciprocity that this category entails 
between ‘overdetermination’ and ‘underdetermina-
tion’. This corresponds to the specific innovation 
introduced by Althusser in Reading Capital with 
respect to the idea of the overdetermined contra-
diction put forth a few years earlier.36
The rejection of the model of the ‘absent cause’ 
is evident in the way in which Althusser treats the 
concept of metonymic causality, a concept intro-
duced by Jacques-Alain Miller that formalized for 
the first time, in the wake of Lacan, the idea of 
a relationship between causality and absence. In 
‘Action of the Structure’ (1964), Miller presented this 
type of causality as a point of transition between 
Marxism and psychoanalysis, developing it into a 
more general theory of the dependency of the subject 
on the structure via the introduction of the idea of 
the ‘absent cause’. According to this model, follow-
ing the perception of the structure by a subject, the 
structure governs the real by ‘not being there’.37 If this 
theory was later used in Reading Capital, especially 
by Rancière in relation to fetishism, the concept of 
‘structural causality’ as deployed by Althusser none-
theless stands at a certain distance from Miller’s 
specific attempt to make ‘metonymic causality’ func-
tion in both psychoanalysis and Marxism. Whereas 
Miller’s concept involved a perceiving subject in its 
relationship with a determinate structure, what 
is at the core of ‘structural causality’ seems to be 
hardly conceivable by means of ‘metonymic causality’: 
namely, the efficacy of a structure on elements that 
are not necessarily ‘perceiving subjects’, and above all 
the efficacy of a structure on subordinated structures 
(plural).38
Even though Althusser does not criticize the 
concept of metonymic causality explicitly, nonethe-
less he tries to subordinate the idea of absence that 
it implies to the idea of the presence of the structure 
in its effects; that is, to subordinate it to a Spinozist 
conception of immanence. For example, in a passage 
that was suppressed from the second edition of 
Reading Capital, Althusser points out that the concept 
of Darstellung (which, for him, was Marx’s name for 
structural causality, or at least the name by means of 
which Marx came closest to naming the concept of 
this new type of causality) can mean both the absence 
and the presence of the structure in its effects. But 
immediately afterwards he notes: 
I believe that understood as the concept of the ef-
ficacy of an absent cause, this concept is perfectly 
fitted to designate the absence in person of the 
structure from its effects considered in the oblique 
perspective of their existence [perspective rasante] 
adding that it is necessary to insist on the other 
aspect, the immanence or presence of the cause in 
its effects.39 
To be sure, this formulation (‘oblique perspec-
tive’) is quite obscure, and the fact that Althusser 
suppressed the passage in the second edition attests 
that he was aware of that. However, it is clear that 
Althusser intends to limit the idea of an absent cause 
to a certain perspective, and this move has the effect 
of limiting the validity of metonymic causality: the 
risk that Althusser sees in the idea of an absent 
cause is that it reintroduces surreptitiously an idea 
of transcendence by referring to an absence that 
would automatically be conceived as a ‘beyond’.40 
Nonetheless, the priority attributed by Althusser to 
the presence of the cause in its effects does not mean 
that within structural causality, absence does not 
play any role. 
In the chapter on time in Reading Capital,41 
Althusser attempts to develop the concept of histori-
cal time according to the concept of structural cau-
sality, and to flesh out the concept of ‘conjuncture’. 
He does so by arguing that the Marxist conception 
of the ‘whole’ has a crucial consequence for the 
theorization of the temporality of this ‘whole’. As the 
levels or instances are not, as in the Hegelian model, 
reducible to an original simple unity, ‘each of the 
different levels of the whole does not have the same 
historical existence’, and it is thus necessary to ‘assign 
to each level a peculiar time, relatively autonomous 
and hence relatively independent, even in its depend-
ence, of the “times” of the other levels’.42 Thus, unlike 
the time proper to the expressive whole, this time 
cannot be subjected to an ‘essential section’, a neat 
cut that reveals the ‘coeval character’ of all the levels 
of the whole (which are not, in the expressive whole, 
properly speaking, different from each other). To 
account for the double situation of dependence and 
independence of the levels of the whole, Althusser 
introduces the notion of underdetermination:
to speak of differential historical temporality 
absolutely obliges us … to think, in its peculiar 
articulation, the function of such an element or 
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such a level in the current configuration of the 
whole; to determine the relation of articulation 
of this element as a function of other elements, of 
this structure as a function of other structures; 
it obliges us to define what has been called its 
overdetermination or underdetermination, as a 
function of the structure of the determination of 
the whole.43
First, let us note that in this context, over- and 
underdetermination are not used in reference to the 
concept of contradiction. Earlier on, in For Marx, 
Althusser had spoken of the overdetermination 
of the contradiction; later on, he would return to 
these terms saying that there exists a ‘threshold’ 
of determination of the contradiction that must be 
reached for a revolution to happen.44 Here, though, 
the idea of a ‘threshold’ is not mentioned. Althusser 
uses over- and underdetermination in reference to 
the levels in a general situation. In this context, 
they indicate the reciprocity, internal to structural 
causality, between independence and dependence, 
between imbrication and autonomy in the develop-
ment of each instance. The point that is left 
unexplained here is the exact relationship between 
over- and underdetermination, the question being 
whether one of the two can be considered primary. 
Could not underdetermination be the effect of the 
overdetermination itself? Or could we not think that 
overdetermination (which is by definition uneven) is 
possible because there is a constitutive underdetermi-
nation? The conclusion that we could draw from the 
very impossibility of answering these questions is 
perhaps more interesting: the key point here is that 
Althusser, by not establishing a hierarchy between 
them, is postulating both over- and underdetermina-
tion as co-originary, as it were; thus, they are both 
included in the concept of structural causality in 
the same way, without there being any precedence 
of one over the other.45
The crucial consequence that Althusser draws 
from this conception of differential time is that the 
concept of ‘present’ must be radically reformulated. 
Althusser substitutes for the idea of the present as an 
‘instant’ the concept of ‘conjuncture’, which becomes 
the name of the ‘present’ within the framework of 
structural causality. The present is not a simple 
moment, but is in itself a complex moment, ‘a time 
of times’, a time whose characteristic is to be ‘non-
present’ to itself. As such, the idea of a complex and 
multiple present has an important consequence. On 
the one hand, it opposes the idea, which is linked 
by Althusser to the empirical conception of time (of 
which the model is Aristotle’s Physics), according to 
which time is a linear succession of instants that are 
in themselves simple; on the other, it also refuses the 
idea that each present of the ‘whole’ is a ‘full’ present, 
a present where all the elements coexist expressing 
one another.
It is this play of over- and underdetermination 
that grounds the role of ‘absence’ in the scientific 
knowledge of the conjuncture. Althusser writes:
the present of one level is, so to speak, the absence 
of another, and this co-existence of a ‘presence’ 
and absences is simply the effect of the structure 
of the whole in its articulated decentricity. What 
is thus grasped as absences in a localized presence 
is precisely the non-localization of the structure of 
the whole.46 
In this passage, the notion of absence is clearly 
admitted. There is, however, a crucial difference with 
respect to the absence that we find in ‘metonymic 
causality’. 
 First, we must note that Althusser refers to a 
system of absences, rather than to the absence of 
a cause. Whereas for Miller the absence is the 
absence of the structure, Althusser is emphasizing 
the plurality of the absences, which correspond to 
the different and intertwined structures making up 
the complex of structural causality. Second, these 
‘absences’ here are a function of the presence. It is 
not, in other words, an absence that is transcendent 
with respect to presence: ‘absence’ is the name of the 
‘non-contemporaneity’ of the conjuncture – and not 
its principle of organization. Therefore, according to 
this passage, for Althusser any absence is always a 
function of presence, or, better said, the plurality of 
absences is the modality of the presence of the whole.
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Determinate absence and 
the logic of irruption
How does Althusser’s insistence on presence-
absences link up with the problem of necessity and/
or contingency? As stated at the beginning, Reading 
Capital does not develop this point explicitly – we 
have only the symptomal identification après coup, 
in the introduction, of structural causality and 
‘necessity of contingency’. It is in some letters to 
his psychoanalyst Diaktine, written in 1966, that 
Althusser broaches the problem of a logic capable of 
thinking the ‘birth’ of a novel structure, explicitly 
building on the concepts of non-contemporaneity 
and the system of absences as conceptualized in 
Reading Capital through structural causality.47 Such 
logic is premissed upon a total refusal of the concept 
of genesis, which Althusser had already criticized 
in For Marx and Reading Capital, and the logic that 
such a concept grounds: one according to which the 
emergence of a certain structure, or of a certain 
phenomenon, depends on a linear development of a 
certain unity, which transforms itself into a new kind 
of unity. By contrast, the logic that Althusser seeks to 
extract from his concept of structural causality is one 
in which the transformation of the structure is not 
premissed upon a preliminary moment of totalization 
or unity, but rather upon the internal differentiation 
of the structure, or its non-homogeneity. He writes: 
whereas the ideology of genesis presupposes that 
one can follow the trace of birth … and consid-
ers only what resembles the effect to be explained 
… this new logic can provoke the intervention of 
elements that may even seem to be absent from 
the conditions of a certain phenomenon. I believe 
that you will agree that absence possesses a certain 
efficacy, on the condition that it be not absence in 
general, or any other Heideggerian ‘openness’, but a 
determinate absence.48
The crucial term, here, is obviously ‘determinate 
absence’, and it suggests that Althusser is consciously 
rejecting the notion of an ‘absent cause’. It is from this 
conception that Althusser draws the consequences as 
to the irruption of a novel structure. By referring to 
Marx’s conceptualization of the transition from the 
feudal mode of production to capitalism, Althusser 
argues:
This structure cannot be thought, in its appear-
ance [surgissement], as the effect of a filiation, but 
as the effect of a conjunction. This new logic has 
nothing to do with the linear causality of filia-
tion, nor with Hegelian ‘dialectical’ logic, which 
only says out loud what is implicitly contained in 
the logic of linear causality. The elements defined 
by Marx [free labour-power, accumulated capital 
and technological inventions – SP] ‘combine’, or 
‘conjoin’ by ‘taking hold’ in a new structure… What 
is important in Marx’s demonstration is that the 
three elements are not contemporary products of 
one and the same situation.49 
What is crucial is that this theory of conjunction, 
based on the underdetermination and overdetermi-
nation of the whole (only the non-contemporaneity 
of the structure with itself allows for the production 
of ‘new elements’ that can eventually conjoin), is sup-
posed to account for the ‘irruption’ of a new structure 
in such a way that the passage from one structure 
to another is not a necessary one. According to this 
logic, the elements that enter into the new combina-
tion that makes up the new structure are produced by 
the ‘old’ structure. But they are neither produced at 
the same time nor are products of the same genealogy 
(a term that Balibar had introduced in his contribu-
tion to Reading Capital);50 nor do they generate one 
another. Above all, they do not include the sufficient 
conditions of their conjunction, or of their ‘taking 
hold’, a concept that Althusser uses precisely to 
mean this conjunction/combination. In a sense, we 
might well say that, according to Althusser, feudalism 
posed the conditions of its own ‘overcoming’; but the 
conjunction, precisely, is what is not produced by 
feudalism itself as the outcome of its own internal 
laws. Thus, the production of a new ‘structure’ (its 
‘taking hold’) is to be conceived as a real production: 
as Althusser suggested (in the passage from Reading 
Capital quoted earlier) we need to conceive ‘the his-
torical relation between a result and its conditions of 
existence as a relation of production’, and therefore as 
‘what we can call the necessity of its contingency’. In 
other words, these conditions become conditions of 
‘overcoming’ only by virtue of a surplus of contingency. 
The same holds, evidently, for capitalism: to say that 
capitalism produces the elements that can lead to 
communism does not mean that capitalism is its own 
gravedigger: what is determinant is what capitalism 
does not ‘produce’ as its own results – that is, the 
combination of the elements in a new structure. From 
such a perspective, the passage from one ‘moment’ 
(in the Hegelian sense) to another is a contingent 
one. And it is in this sense that there is a necessity of 
contingency, a necessity of a surplus of contingency 
that brings together elements produced within the 
structure, in the internally underdetermined and 
overdetermined unity of the structure – this unity 
being a non-contemporaneous one.
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It is true that this aspect of the ‘surplus of con-
tingency’ remains underdeveloped in these letters, 
in the sense that Althusser does not name it explic-
itly. We may therefore conclude that, just as Marx 
failed to produce explicitly the concepts that were 
nonetheless at work in Capital, Althusser failed to 
draw the conclusions implicit in the premisses of 
his argument, to which he, nonetheless, hinted at 
in the above-mentioned passage of Reading Capital. 
This is perhaps due to the fact that it is not that easy 
to find such a conceptualization of the ‘necessity of 
contingency’ in Marx, even if some passages – like the 
one commented upon by Althusser – may be thought 
to go in that direction. It is perhaps for this reason 
that Althusser, in the same months, thought that 
the thinker who provided the purest model of this 
‘surplus of contingency’ was not Marx but Rousseau. 
In the notes from a course that Althusser was giving 
at the École normale supérieure in 1966 on the Second 
Discourse, he argues that in Rousseau it is possible to 
find a model of a causality without centre and without 
origin (a model in nuce of the concept of structural 
causality) as well as its counterpart: the idea that 
the ‘transition’ between an epoch and another in the 
unfolding of the historical process is premissed upon 
the irruption of a contingent accident. Commenting 
on Rousseau’s account of the unfolding of the histori-
cal process, Althusser notes:
the state of pure nature (I), the state of youth of 
the world (II), the state of war (III) do not hold in 
themselves any principle of resolution of their own 
contradiction … there had to occur some accidents 
to produce the transition from a state to another… 
For Rousseau every genesis is the transformation 
of a determinate contingency [d’une contingence] 
in necessity: that which comes about contingently 
[comme contingent] produces a new and irreversible 
necessity. Every necessity, conversely [inversement], 
has at its origin a determinate contingency.51
It is probably useless to point out that this reading 
of Rousseau, which, as always in Althusser, comple-
ments his reading of Marx,52 pushes the concept of 
structural causality at the greatest possible distance 
from any idea of a logical or metaphysical necessity 
and stands in contrast to both Spinoza’s and Hegel’s 
necessity: there is neither a teleological necessity, nor 
a logical one. It is clear that Rousseau, among the 
authors he is in dialogue with at this time, provided 
Althusser with the purest example of a thought that 
promoted contingency – through the notions of 
‘encounter’ and ‘accident’ – to the rank of what is 
determinant in the last instance in the transition 
from one ‘phase’, ‘structure’ or ‘mode of production’ 
to another. Contingency is not, as it was for Spinoza 
and for Hegel, an epistemological weakness of human 
knowledge; it is ontologically constitutive of history. 
By 1966 Althusser had developed a conception of 
structural causality that, building on the ideas of 
non-contemporaneity and system of absences, had 
come to incorporate contingency as an essential 
dimension. The internal differentiation of the present 
in the overdetermination and underdetermination 
of the process, which is a process of processes, a 
structure of structures, may well pose the conditions 
of the replacement of a structure with another. Such 
a replacement does not rely on a moment of totaliza-
tion, but is premissed upon a necessary surplus of 
contingency that can make some elements ‘conjoin’. 
Far from being an ‘implacable logic’ of the timeless 
reproduction of a given structure, as it has been read, 
structural causality was Althusser’s attempt to think 
through the category of ‘necessity of contingency’, 
and to provide Marxism with a category by means 
of which to think of history – its reproduction and 
also its ruptures – without resorting to the concept 
of contradiction. Althusser would criticize himself 
for his own detour through Spinoza a few years 
later, arguing that the price of that detour – the 
loss of the concept of contradiction – had been too 
high. However, what we find here (provided that we 
read structural causality without Lacan and without 
structuralism) is a concept that has not been fully 
explored in its potentialities 
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